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Abstract: This working paper argues that the rise of transnational regulation has a 
transformative impact on law. It examines the field of transnational environmental regulation to 
show that its proliferation challenges the continued appropriateness of representations of law as: 
(i) territorial, (ii) emanating from the state, (iii) composed of a public and private sphere, (iv) 
constitutive and regulatory in function, and (v) cohesive and regimented. Instead, law is 
increasingly perceived as (i) delocalised, (ii) flowing from a plurality of sources, (iii) 
organisationally inchoate, (iv) reflexive and coordinating in function, and (v) polycentric. 
Together, these shifts in perception amount to a transformation that the paper identifies as the 
transnationalisation of law. The paper then explores three responses to the transnationalisation 
of law. It distinguishes responses motivated by a desire to reclaim the traditional conception of 
law from those that seek to reconstruct law at the transnational level and, thirdly, responses that 
advocate a context-responsive reconceptualisation of law. Each response, it will be shown, 
creates a different set of opportunities for and challenges to the relevance of law for transnational 
regulation. 
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 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Transnational environmental regulation problematises many conventions about the 
nature and role of law. This paper identifies five dominant perspectives that have 
shaped our thinking about law and its relation to society. It explains how the rise of 
transnational regulation challenges each of these perspectives and invites alternative 
modes of understanding law. I refer to this process of problematisation, 
contestation and reform as the ‘transnationalisation of law’. The paper first 
examines the drivers and focal points of change. It then continues to canvas a range 
of potential responses to the transnationalisation of law and highlight significant 
strengths and weaknesses of each response. In so doing, this paper provides a critical 
frame of reference through which to analyse the burgeoning body of procedural and 
substantive norms that are increasingly treated as constituent parts of an emergent 
field of transnational environmental law.  
 
 
 
1. TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
AND THE CHALLENGE TO LAW 
 
Transnational environmental regulatory initiatives cause legal complexity. Consider, 
for instance, the intricate legal and regulatory context in which the Covenant of 
Mayors operates. The Covenant is a climate change initiative to which many of 
Europe’s major cities voluntarily subscribe. It is administered by the Covenant of 
Mayors Office (COMO), which is established and funded by the European 
Commission. Participating towns and cities must develop a baseline emission 
inventory and are required to submit a Sustainable Energy Action Plan (SEAP), 
which maps out the different approaches and policies that they intend to implement 
to achieve the minimum 20% CO2 emission reduction target. Additionally, 
participating towns and cities are expected to submit regular implementation 
reports.1 Failure to meet the membership criteria can negatively impact on a city’s 
access to the funding opportunities created within the framework of the Covenant, 
and may result in their membership being suspended.  
Which legal regime governs the relation between the Commission, the COMO 
and the signatory towns and cities? The answer is supremely challenging. The official 
text of the Covenant gives no indication as to applicable law;2 nor does the adhesion 
form that town and city councils are requested to sign as a confirmation of their 
intent to join.3 Should such determination need to be made, several jurisdictions 
                                                      
1 V. Heyvaert, ‘What’s in a Name? The Covenant of Mayors as Transnational Environmental Regulation’ 
(2013) 22:1 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law, pp. 78–90, at 81. 
2 http://www.eumayors.eu/IMG/pdf/covenantofmayors_text_en.pdf  
3 http://www.eumayors.eu/support/library_en.html.  
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could credibly vie for the spot. At the very least, a claim could be made for the 
relations between Covenant parties to be governed by European Union law, or 
Belgian law (the law of the jurisdiction in which the European Commission and the 
COMO are located), or the law of the country in which the town or city concerned 
is located. Either choice creates different advantages and limitations. A choice for 
EU law would reflect the relevance of both EU institutions in the scheme and of 
EU legal commitments as the key reference points to determine the minimum 
aspirations that Covenant members agree to embrace in the fight against climate 
change. On the other hand, it would arguably defeat the deliberate establishment of 
the Covenant outside the institutional apparatus of the EU. It might be seen to 
favour EU-based participating cities over participants from outside the European 
Union, and it would subject the Covenant to a relatively thin legal regime that has 
limited experience in both judicial review and adjudicating contractual relationships. 
This may not be the best choice for the governance of such complex, multi-partite 
relationships.  
Alternatively, the Brussels location of both the European Commission and the 
Covenant of Mayors Office point towards Belgian law. This choice shares with the 
previous one the advantage of consistency in that all relations under the Covenant 
would be reviewed against the same legal standards, without suffering from the 
relative paucity of experience that characterises EU law. On the other hand, the 
choice is highly formalistic and could produce inefficient, artificial and potentially 
unfair results. The prospect that, say, a disagreement between an Italian funding 
body and an Italian town or city would be shoehorned into the Belgian jurisdiction 
purely because the facilitating bodies are formally established there, is unattractive. 
This is all the more so since the connection between these facilitating bodies and 
the Belgian state is, itself, tenuous. Yet reverting to the law of the country in which 
the parties involved in the proceedings are located, would lead to both legal 
fragmentation and considerable complexity, as various authorities in different 
countries could stamp their own, disparate interpretations on the legal arrangements 
under the Covenant and the ensuing rights and responsibilities.  
The choice of law challenges represented by the Covenant extend beyond the 
determination of the governing regime, and include the identification of the 
appropriate legal discipline. It is by no means clear whether any conflict between, 
for instance, the COMO and a signatory city regarding the former’s decision to 
suspend membership rights is contractual, administrative, or even tort-based in 
nature. If the Covenant is treated as a regulatory regime, the first option seems 
appropriate. However, the voluntary nature of membership, with no overt scope for 
punishment beyond exclusion from the club for non-adherence to club rules, makes 
the case for contract law. From a formalistic angle, the unilateral commitment 
structure of the Covenant might argue in favour of treating any disagreements 
between parties as being of a private but non-contractual nature. 
These reflections convey a first impression of the destabilising impact of 
transnational regulatory activity on assumptions about legal governance. But the 
examples still underplay the essentially disruptive impact of transnational 
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environmental law (TER) on the very concept and content of law. Law, in the 
preceding example, is talked of as the pre-existing governance regime under which 
the Covenant resorts. The latter is portrayed, for all intents and purposes, as the 
passive subject that undergoes law and adjudication. Yet if we embrace the notion 
that the Covenant produces behaviour that is at least in part regulatory, then the 
normative content actively developed through Covenant processes may, itself, be a 
source of law. The Convention does not merely operate in an intricate legal context; 
it creates an intricate legal context.4 Transnational, decentred regulation thus co-
produces transnational, decentred law. Moreover, this transnationalisation of law 
calls into question the usefulness of many of the attributes that conventionally serve 
to distinguish law from non-law.5 
 
 
 
2. MAPPING THE IMPACTS OF TRANSNATIONAL 
ENVIRONEMENTAL REGULATION ON THE CONVENTIONAL 
ATTRIBUTES OF LAW 
 
The following sections offer a framework for organising and discussing the 
transnationalisation of law. It is argued that to understand the breadth and richness 
of reactions to the rise of TER, account must be taken of its impact on conventions 
regarding the location, the sources, the organisation, the functions, and the structure 
of law. The framework enables us to map the range of challenges to law 
encapsulated in the emergence of transnational regulation. This, in turn, fosters 
appreciation of the different and often divergent reactions to the 
transnationalisation of law, which are reviewed in the third part of this paper.  
 
 Conventional Context Transnational Context 
Location Territorial De-Localised 
Source Based in or derived from 
the state 
Plural 
Organisation Public and Private Law Inchoate 
Functions Constitutive, Regulatory, 
Communicative 
Cognitive, Reflexive, 
Coordinative 
Structure Cohesive and regimented Polycentric 
 
                                                      
4 Cf. Roger Cotterrell, ‘What is Transnational Law’ (2012) Vol 37(2) Law & Social Inquiry, p. 515; Karl-
Heinz Ladeur, ‘The Evolution of General Administrative Law and the Emergence of Postmodern 
Administrative Law’ (March 21, 2011). Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 16/2011. Available at 
SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792062 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1792062, p. 3, 8. 
5 Cf. Cotterrell, n. 4 above, pp. 512 & 515; Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: 
Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power’ 76 Law & Contemp. Probs. (2013) pp. 118, 130–131. 
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2.1. LOCATION: TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE 
‘END OF GEOGRAPHY’ 
 
Law is an intensely territorial concept. Laws emanate from the city, the state, the 
empire, and hold sway within — and only within — the geographical zone that falls 
under the governing bodies’ control, a zone bordered by physical and frequently 
contested frontiers. The intimacy of the bond between government, territory, and 
law resonates in the notion of ‘jurisdiction,’ which means both the official power to 
make legal decisions and judgements, and the territory over which legal authority 
extends. The exclusivity of the relationship is encapsulated in our understanding of 
legal sovereignty, which represents the entitlement to legal autonomy and self-
determination and ‘rests fundamentally on the notion of exclusive authority over 
discrete parcels of territory’.6 Indeed, the very notion of independent statehood 
signifies a successful claim to a connection between a governance regime, a physical 
territory and its population. This connection conveys the entitlement to militarily 
defend the territory, to levy taxes within the territory, to issue laws for the territory, 
and enter into international agreements on behalf of the territory.7  
The rise of transnational regulation threatens the bond between law and 
geography in two ways. First, it is difficult to locate transnational actors in a 
particular jurisdiction; they do not have a ‘seat’ of authority in the way that state 
regulators do. Secondly, there is no clearly demarcated field of application of the 
normative content they produce. For private environmental standard setters, for 
example, the size of their field of application depends entirely on the successful 
uptake of the standards. 
The challenges that TER poses to law and geography are particularly pressing 
with regard to transnational regulatory activity that takes place outside the auspices 
of a pre-established supra- or international legal framework. Unless they restrict 
their membership and field of action explicitly to a single state, private 
environmental regulators are genuinely and doubly de-localised. As illustrated in the 
Covenant of Mayors example, there is no obvious candidate jurisdiction in which 
to ground (quasi) regulatory behaviour that occurs in a transnational network. 
Often, there will be no legal discipline that can claim undisputed governance over 
the relations that unfold within the network.8 Secondly, the normative content that 
is generated through the transnational network is, itself, de-localised. The Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) does not create American, Japanese or French 
sustainable forestry standards; it produces FSC sustainable forestry standards. If the 
FSC standards are accepted as transnational law,9 then this is indeed law that has 
sprung up in the absence of claims to territory and sovereignty. 
                                                      
6 See Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The End of Geography: The Changing Nature of the International System and 
the Challenge to International Law’ (2014) Vol 25(1) European Journal of International Law, p. 13. 
7 Ibid, pp. 13–14. 
8 Cf. Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, Informal International Lawmaking (2012, OUP), at p. 
2. 
9 Ibid. 
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Transnational regulation developed in implementation of regional or 
international legal frameworks, such as pollutant emission limit values adopted 
under the EU Industrial Emissions Directive10 or decisions to include further 
species in the endangered lists annexed to the CITES Convention,11 are 
comparatively less problematic. The geographical realm of application of such 
regional and international regulatory measures formally corresponds to the territory 
of the signatory states, which functions as an expanded field of jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, in this context, too, challenges arise. They are perhaps less acute than 
those created by the rise of private transnational regulation, but they are certainly 
not negligible. In the EU, tensions arise because of perennial need to mediate 
competing claims to territorial exclusivity. At the international level, in turn, the 
relevance of territoriality is significantly eroded by the growing complexity of 
international decision making and the dearth of international administrative law. 
The following paragraphs explain each point in turn. 
Preliminarily, it should be noted that the field of application of EU regulation, 
including particularly its environmental product standards, arguably transcends EU 
jurisdiction. Like political power, regulatory influence does not stop at the border. 
We see a recent iteration of this awareness in Anu Bradford’s ‘Brussels effect’, which 
discusses the extra-jurisdictional ‘pull’ of legal regimes such as the EU’s internal 
market regulations. Companies that seek access to the affluent EU market must 
conform to the EU’s environmental product standards, wherever they are located.12 
Hence it could be claimed that, in the EU context too, the connection between 
regulation and jurisdiction has weakened. This argument is, however, not entirely 
persuasive. First, extraterritorial regulatory influence is a function of the size and 
desirability of the home jurisdiction as a market; not of its transnational character. 
Moreover, regulatory influence does not fundamentally call into question the 
relevance of territorial jurisdiction. If anything, it could be seen as reinforcing the 
importance of geography. It is only because the EU can claim legal sovereignty over 
the EU’s territory in matters of product regulation and close off the borders to non-
complying products that the impetus to conform outside the geographical 
boundaries of the jurisdiction arises. 
If the external influence of EU law strengthens rather than weakens the 
connection between law and territory, EU law’s many, often fraught primacy tussles 
with the Member States are of a more unravelling nature. Internally, the growth of 
a level of legal authority that geographically overlaps that of the Member States has 
put enormous pressure on domestic conceptions of the relation between law, 
                                                      
10 Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) [2010] OJ 
L334/17. 
11 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 29 Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 
Washington, DC (US), 3 Mar. 1973, in force 1 July 1975, available at: 
https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php. 
12 This is only one, though important, component of the factors producing the Brussels effect. For a full 
discussion, see Anu Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) Vol 107(1) Northwesten University School of Law, p. 
1. 
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territory and sovereignty.13 Many of the landmark European constitutional cases of 
the past decade reflect, precisely, a preoccupation to reconceptualise or reclaim 
sovereignty over the national ‘parcel of territory’ in the face of competing claims 
from a centralised, de-localised legal authority.14 In the EU context, the rise of 
transnational regulation has not resulted in the absence of geography but has co-
produced competing claims to territorial sovereignty that, from a different vantage 
point but equally urgently, call for a reconsideration of traditional assumptions 
regarding the relation between law and geography. 
Regulatory measures adopted under the auspices of international treaties put 
relatively less pressure on domestic claims to territorial sovereignty because their 
authority is typically contingent on ex-post state validation. Yet at the international 
level, too, the bond between law and geography is increasingly strained. A first 
contributing factor to de-localisation is the growing institutional complexity of 
international regulatory and administrative decision making. Consider, for example, 
the approval of Clean Development (CDM) projects under Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. For such approval to come about, at least three different entities need to 
make affirmative decisions: the Designated National Authority (DNA), which 
approves the participant’s project proposal and forwards the project for validation; 
the Designated Operational Entity (DOE), a private third-party certifier that 
validates the project, and the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB), which registers 
and thereby formally accepts a validated project as a CDM project activity.15 Given 
the geographical spread of DNAs, DOEs and the CDM EB, it is difficult to anchor 
the set of decisions that culminates in CDM approval within a particular jurisdiction. 
A potential determination that, ultimately, the decision is taken in furtherance of the 
Kyoto Protocol and that, therefore, its jurisdiction corresponds to the combined 
territory of the signatory states, does not offer a genuine resolution. First, the 
international regime itself provides few administrative principles and standards that 
could be marshalled to govern CDM decision making. Resorting to the 
administrative law bodies of the signatory states instead is equally problematic, 
because these bodies differ from state to state. Hence, CDM decisions are floating 
entities: they are disconnected from the national level without having been 
adequately relocated in the international sphere. 
In sum, the intensity and precise nature of the challenge differ, but all main 
variants of TER cause a degree of de-localisation of law.  
 
                                                      
13 C. Thornhill, ‘National sovereignty and the constitution of transnational law: a sociological approach to 
a classical antinomy’ (2013) 3(4) Transnational Legal Theory, pp. 394–460, at. 406; A. van Bogdandy & S. 
Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 
Common Market Law Review 1417; N. Krisch, ‘Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism? Legal Order and Political 
Stability in the Postnational Space’ (2011) 24(4) Ratio Juris, pp. 386–412 at 407. 
14 2 BVerfGE 2/08 Treaty of Lisbon, Judgment of 30 June 2009 (German Constitutional Court); BVerfGE 
37, 271 2 BvL 52/71 (Solange I–Beschluß); K 32/09 Treaty of Lisbon, Judgment of 24 September 2010) 
Polish Constitutional Court)’ Pl. US 5/12: Slovak Pensions, Judgment of 31 January 2012 (Czech 
Constitutional Court). 
15 M. J. Kang & J. Park, ‘Analysis of the Partnership Network in the Clean Development Mechanism’ (2013) 
52 Energy Policy, p. 543. 
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2.2. SOURCE: TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE 
TRIPLE CHALLENGE TO THE STATE 
 
Stronger even than the link with physical territory is the connection between law 
and the concept of the state. The 19th and 20th centuries, in equal parts celebrated 
and denounced as the heyday of the nation state, witnessed the consolidation of the 
trinity of state government, legislature and judiciary as a dominant, even exclusive 
source of law. In the third millennium, in contrast, the exclusivity — even, the 
dominance — of the state as source of law is under threat.16 
The proliferation after World War II of public international law in policy fields 
outside the traditional zones of international relations, including environmental 
protection, introduced a greater degree of diversity in recognised sources of law. 
However, this development did not yet genuinely call into question the centrality of 
the state because international legal authority is understood as derived from state 
authority.17 States sign up to international agreements. States agree to recognise the 
competence of international courts and tribunals. State law and practice are the key 
benchmarks for the recognition of customary international law. Instead of 
constituting a threat, public international law validates of the state as the inescapable, 
original source of law. 
The arrival of EU law as a source of law, on the other hand, heralds a more 
challenging proposition. The extent to which the exercise of legal authority at the 
EU level is reducible to the (member) state is a topic of endless examination and 
contestation. This is not the place to discuss the range of positions in this rich and 
ever evolving debate. It suffices to say that, to many participants in the debate, the 
representation of EU law as an affirmation of its Member States’ prerogative to 
enter into international binding agreements, which therefore shores up the legal 
sovereignty of the state, strains the limits of credibility. Arguably, such 
representation overlooks the role of key players, such as the European Commission 
and the European Parliament, that are not accountable to the state.18 It ignores the 
existence of majority voting among Member States.19 It does not account for the 
enormous issue-interdependence and complexity of EU decision making, which 
easily reduces Member State day-to-day self-determination to a purely theoretical 
possibility.20 To a more significant extent than public international law, EU law 
                                                      
16 Thornhill, n. 13 above, p. 406. 
17 C. Brütsch & D. Lehmkuhl, ‘Complex Legalization and the Many Moves to Law’ in Brütsch & Lehmkuhl, 
Law and Legalization in Transnational Relations (Routledge, 2007), pp. 22–23; J HH Weiler, ‘The Geology of 
International Law — Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy,’ (2003) 63 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches 
Recht und Völkerrecht, pp. 547–62, at 553–6. 
18 A. Ellinas & E. Suleiman, ‘Supranationalism in a Transnational Bureaucracy: The Case of the European 
Commission’ (2011) 49(5) Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 923–947; E. O. Eriksen & J. E. Fossum 
(eds) Democracy in the European Union. Integration Through Deliberation (Routledge, 2002), p. 4. 
19 Cf S. C. Sieberson, ‘Inching Towards EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity 
under the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2010) 50(4) Virginia Journal of International Law, 920, pp. 926–932. 
20 R. Kardasheva, ‘Package Deals in EU Legislative Politics’ (2013) 54(4) American Journal of Political Science, 
pp. 858–874. 
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worries at the fabric of state-centred conceptualisations of law and legality. Its 
existence calls into question those classical iterations of the rule of recognition that 
inexorably lead back to the constitutional authority of the state. 
The proliferation of transnational regulation intensifies this challenge in several 
ways. First, the provenance of the rules that are deemed to govern much of 
transnational regulatory activity is unclear. This is definitely the case for private 
transnational regulation, which typically has no obviously identifiable ‘home 
jurisdiction’. But it is also the case for transnational regulation under the auspices of 
international legal instruments, because neither these instruments nor public 
international law are rich on legal provisions that are, essentially, administrative in 
nature. It is therefore not surprising that discussions on the legality and legitimacy 
of transnational environmental regulation, for example, often refer to abstract 
notions of, e.g., accountability or transparency without clarifying which legal 
regime’s rendition of accountability or transparency is targeted.21 They seemingly 
operate on the assumed existence of an inchoate, common conception of the 
meaning of administrative standards, but it is rarely made explicit where this 
common conception comes from and what it consists of.22 Karl-Heinz Ladeur 
recognises and advocates the development of an experimental, inductive approach 
to the production of a new administrative legality: ‘Particular emphasis should be 
placed on the question of the ‘sources’ of the emerging regulatory order. Arguably, 
the new relational ‘rationality of networks’ can no longer be regarded as being 
‘deposited’ in a canonical (legal) text; instead, legal meaning must be generated from 
several overlapping texts and contexts of practice in an experimental approach that 
comprises both the domestic and the transnational realms’.23 
Secondly, transnational regulation may, itself, be considered as a source of law, 
one that is emphatically not traceable to the state. The legal content produced by 
transnational environmental regulators does not just problematise the state’s 
dominance as a source of law (as EU law does), it raises the possibility of law in the 
very absence of the state. Roger Cotterrell speaks of a paradigm shift: ‘One might 
think of transnational networks of community as the ultimate source of their own 
legal regulation but, equally, as being subject to legal regulation created in other such 
networks that impinge on them (…) So it is possible to envisage a kind of paradigm 
shift in legal inquiry provoked in part by the development of transnational law: a 
shift away from a limited nation-state focus and toward a new emphasis on the law-
creating potential of complex, interpenetrating networks of social relationships of 
community’.24  
                                                      
21 See, e,g., R. Glicksman & T. Kaime, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Accountability Mechanisms for 
Ecosystem Services Markets in in the United States and the European Union’ (2013) 2(2) Transnational 
Environmental Law, pp. 259–283. 
22 See B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch & R. B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 
68(3/4), Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 15–61, at 29–31 (on the difficulty of identifying the source(s) of 
global administrative law). 
23 Ladeur, n. 4 above, p. 249.  
24 Cotterell, n. 4 above, p. 515. 
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Both as author and subject, TER calls into question the assumption that the 
construction of law is the privilege of a single actor (the state) or, at most, a select 
few.25 It even calls into question the long established function of the source of law 
as a rule of recognition. Indeed, if we take TER seriously as a source of law, the 
question arises whether legal authorship is genuinely knowable and attributable. In 
the multi-directional and reflexive environment of transnational regulatory 
networks, the distinction between regulator and regulatee fades.26 In a Habermasian 
sense, it could be argued that TER blurs the distinction between strategic action and 
communicative action.27 With it, opportunities to designate with conviction those 
nodes within the network that constitute the source of law, recede. TER thus erodes 
the conceptual walls protecting formal representations of law and regulation —
representations that thrive on binary distinctions between regulator and regulatee, 
law maker and legal subject, legality and illegality — and uncompromisingly 
confronts us with the much messier, reflexive reality in which law is being made and 
experienced through the countless interactions of ever permutating groups and 
networks.  
 
2.3. ORGANISATION: TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND 
THE DISSOLUTION OF DISCIPLINARY DIVIDES 
 
Possibly the most tangible pressure that transnationalisation exerts on the legal 
system is exercised through the problematisation of public/private disciplinary 
divides.28 This is largely a consequence of private and hybrid actors stepping into 
roles that are traditionally associated with public authority. 
A significant proportion of transnational environmental governance initiatives 
are elective. Membership is voluntary. Non-compliance with relevant standards and 
practices is not necessarily actively policed or, should it be, may not entail punitive 
consequences beyond the suspension or withdrawal of membership status. Yet the 
compliance pull that radiates from these programmes often belies their modest 
formal status.29 In fact, their real but informal authority, and the means it creates to 
ensure the programme’s effectiveness without resorting to the apparatuses of 
administrative and criminal law, are one of the key benchmarks to distinguish 
regulatory initiatives from other, non-regulatory governance structures.30  
The regulatory or near-regulatory character of transnational environmental 
initiatives provokes by now familiar questions of legal governance: should the 
legality of the interactions within the group or network be judged by public or 
                                                      
25 Thornhill, n. 13 above, p. 406. 
26 Brütsch & Lehmkuhl, n. 17 above, p. 23. 
27 Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommuikativen Handlens (Frankfurt am Main; Surhkamp, 1981). 
28 Cf. S. Cassese, ‘Administrative Law without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation’ (2005) 37 
NYU Journal of International Law & Politics, pp. 663–694, at pp. 669 and 679. 
29 P. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism. A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders (CUP, 2014), p. 56. 
30 Heyvaert, n. 1 above, p. 83 
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private law standards? The question is deeply relevant for the day to day organisation 
and conduct of TER since private, contractual behaviour is judged against 
considerably different yardsticks from those used for public, administrative 
behaviour.31 Transparency and openness, for example, are keystone virtues in public 
law. In a private, contractual setting, the qualities of exclusivity and confidentiality 
often take precedence. Moreover, as in matters concerning location and source, the 
ambiguity of TER problematises both the determination of the legal system to 
which regulatory behaviour ought to be subjected, and the disciplinary affiliation of 
the legal content it produces. The potential ramifications of classifying, say, a 
conservation contract as a public act or a private contract are hugely significant, 
particularly when it comes to determining the rights and responsibilities of third 
parties. In a public law sphere, interested outsiders would have greater opportunities 
for involvement in the decision making process and for judicial review. In the 
private sphere, third party rights derived from contract are virtually non-existent. 
On the other hand, any external negative impact from the conservation contract 
may be more easily vindicated if the contract is considered a private arrangement 
than if it is treated as an administrative decision in the pursuit of the public interest.  
The position of much of transnational environmental activity at the crossroads 
of public and private law presents a taxing intellectual puzzle. Yet the challenges run 
deeper: it calls into question the very usefulness of organising the discipline of law 
into demarcated public and private spheres. Pioneering case studies such as Natasha 
Affolder’s work on transnational conservation contracts, and Benjamin 
Richardson’s exploration of tensions between fiduciary and environmental law 
prescriptions in the field of socially responsible investing (SRI), suggest that it is not 
a question of ascertaining the ‘right’ sphere in which to house TER; neither private 
nor public law can autonomously deliver the regulating and legitimising qualities 
that are necessary for such conservation contracts or responsible investment 
practices to flourish.32 
In the transnational regulatory sphere, the walls that separate public and private 
law may therefore lose both their resilience and their usefulness. Their crumbling 
can be read as another tell-tale symptom of the weakening bond between state, 
territory and law.33 The affirmation of private law is, after all, an exercise of public 
authority. Such affirmation may be highly explicit, as in the strategic enactment of 
civil law codes in the Napoleonic era.34 It might also be residually established 
through the legal construction of public institutions with clearly and exhaustively 
designated competencies, privileges and responsibilities. This fences off newly 
established bastions of public authority and lifts them out of the mass of private 
                                                      
31 Cf. Zumbansen, n. 5 above, p. 120. 
32 Natasha Affolder, ‘Transnational Conservation Contracts’ (2012) Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 
443–460; Benjamin J. Richardson, ‘Socially Responsible Investing for Sustainability: Overcoming Its 
Incomplete and Conflicting Rationales’ (2013) Vol 2(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 311–338.  
33 Cf Thornhill, n. 13 above, p. 406. 
34 J.-L. Halpérin, ‘L’Histoire de la Fabrication du Code le Code: Napoléon’, Pouvoirs 2003/4(107), 11–21. 
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entanglements fomented from human interaction. Transnational environmental 
regulation questions both the sturdiness and the relevance of the fence. 
 
2.4. FUNCTION: TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE 
ENHANCED REFLEXIVITY OF LAW 
 
Transnationalisation has re-energised debates regarding the role of law in global 
society. Preliminarily, it should be acknowledged that to talk of ‘the role of law’ and 
the impact of TER on the role of law suggests that, outside the context of 
transnational regulation, the role of law is a singular, universally understood and 
agreed upon concept. Centuries of heated jurisprudential exchange attest that this is 
certainly not the case. Viewpoints abound about what role — or, what combination 
of roles — law fulfils for society, about the relation and ranking between different 
roles, and the desirability to enhance or suppress particular functionalities. The point 
is, rather, that the emergence of transnational regulation, and TER in particular, 
suits some accounts of what law does for society, but problematises others. TER 
thus productively destabilises the debate and creates a new agenda both for those 
who see their account of the role of law affirmed by the rise of TER, and those who 
see law’s functions as frustrated by transnational regulatory activity. 
This examination of the impact of TER on the functions of law starts from a 
familiar place, namely, the mainstream account of the role of law as constitutive of 
regulatory and administrative authority.35 Law sets the terms for the 
institutionalisation of power and thereby enables the very establishment of 
regulatory and administrative institutions. The 1995 UK Environment Act, which 
opens with the lofty words ‘There shall be a body corporate to be known as the 
Environment Agency’; the provisions mapping out the composition and 
competencies of the European Commission, the Council, and the European 
Parliament in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU),36 and any international 
convention article entitled ‘Conference of the Parties,’ embody the constitutive 
function and force of law. The latter two examples simultaneously affirm that the 
constitutive role of law does not disappear beyond the level of the state. However, 
it is severely impacted.37 For every transnational environmental regulator that 
operates under the auspices of exogenous, binding terms of reference, there is a 
counterexample that does not. Private and hybrid regulators such as the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) and the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), and transnational networks such as the Covenant of Mayors, all organise 
without the constitutive pneuma of law.  
                                                      
35 Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘From Administrative Law of Administrative Legitimation? Transnational 
Administrative Law and the Process of European Integration’ (2012) 61(4) International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly, p. 863. 
36 Leviathan, ch. 26, at 189 (R. Tuck (ed.), 1996.). 
37 Thornhill, n. 13 above, pp. 403–404. 
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TER equally puts severe pressure on the regulating functions of law. This refers 
to law’s role as a meta-regulator; a supplier of procedural and substantive norms 
that constitute a framework capable of structuring, supervising and disciplining the 
conduct of regulation.38 This function is typically associated with administrative law. 
It is readily apparent that the triple impacts of de-localisation, institutional 
decentring and the blurring of disciplinary boundaries limit opportunities for 
administrative law to fulfil the functions of structuring, supervising and disciplining 
regulatory behaviour. With the possible exception of EU administrative law, 
supranational administrative legal regimes are normatively thin and disconnected 
from the institutional enforcement apparatus that is vital to enhancing the 
effectiveness of the structuring and disciplining influence of administrative law. As 
the roster of transnational regulators expands, the perceived deficit of administrative 
law to govern their conduct becomes ever more acute.39 
The erosion of the constitutive and regulatory functions of law vis-à-vis 
transnational regulation can also impede law’s communicative function.40 Law is a 
vital channel through which governments and courts publicise their vision of what 
constitutes good regulation and administration. A dearth in constitutive and 
administrative law reduces opportunities for interpellation, debate and, 
consequently, government accountability. 
From this vantage point, TER has a profound and potentially crippling impact 
on law’s functionality. However, not everyone subscribes to the idea of law as 
conceptually and operationally separate from that which it professedly governs. 
According to Ladeur, the constitutive role of law as an external organising principle 
that beams down on regulatory and administrative behaviour has always been an 
illusion: ‘The fundamental forms and components of general administrative law 
have not been developed by the legislator nor by the judiciary (which has made some 
of its implicit rules explicit) but by an experimental search process of the 
administration itself’.41 This account represents a more self-generating and organic 
understanding of law; one in which the role of law is not to create normative content 
but to reflect rules and standards as they emerge and consolidate within the day-to-
day reality of regulatory and administrative decision making. Law is not 
superimposed on the regulatory and administrative life world, it is produced and 
reabsorbed within the very processes and practices that it codifies. It is, in Lon 
Fuller’s words, a ‘language of interaction’.42  
If law is a co-product rather than an originator of decision making, then our 
expectations of its autonomous constitutive and disciplining power have been 
overstated. At most, law can contribute to the ‘stabilization of normative 
                                                      
38 Cf C. Anderson, ‘Contrasting Models of EU Administration in Judicial Review of Risk Regulation’ (2014) 
51 Common Market Law Review, p. 425; A. Alemanno, ‘The Shaping of European Risk Regulation by 
Community Courts,’ Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 18 (2008), pp. 7–10. 
39 Kuo, n. 35 above, p. 863. 
40 V. Heyvaert, ‘Levelling Down, Levelling Up, and Governing Across: Three Responses to Hybridization 
in International Law’ (2009) 20(3) European Journal of International Law, pp. 647–674, at p. 662.  
41 Ladeur, n. 4 above, p. 5. 
42 L.L. Fuller, ‘Law and Human Interaction’ (1977) 47(3/4) Sociological Inquiry, pp. 59–89, at 61. 
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expectations’43 and foster ‘the selection and upholding of such expectations even in 
the face of disappointment’.44 Law is informative rather than formative; law 
facilitates stable self-ordering rather than impose order. 
In the autopoietic/constructivist/interactive perspective associated with the 
writings of authors such as Luhmann, Teubner, Calliess and Renner, Ladeur, and 
Fuller, the key functions of law are facilitative and cognitive. The rise of TER 
changes the way in which law is co-produced, but does not fundamentally threaten 
its facilitative and cognitive functionality. Evidently, the existing corpus of 
international, administrative, environmental and contract law does enough to 
manage uncertainty to an extent that it does not impede the blossoming of manifold 
transnational environmental regulatory initiatives. Expectations between the 
participants in governance networks are stable enough for these networks to persist 
and even thrive.45 Simultaneously, a developing body of decision making protocols 
and standard-setting practice is being documented. Protocols and standards fulfil a 
vital informative function about what the normative expectations within the 
transnational regime are.46 The information thus created is diverse and 
differentiated, but it does contribute to an evolving, flexible understanding of the 
normativity of TER, which then in turn helps to stabilise continuing transnational 
regulatory and administrative behaviour.  
In sum, accounts that position law as a hierarchically superior force external to 
administration yet capable of shaping its design and operation, are threatened by the 
rise of transnational regulatory regimes.47 The latter seem to exemplify much more 
aptly law’s reflexive potential. To some, the shift in representation from ‘law as 
authority’ to ‘law as reflection’ constitutes a diminishment of the status of law and 
its role in society. To others, it is instead a closing of the gap between the myth and 
the reality of law.  
 
2.5. STRUCTURE: TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND 
REGIME POLYCENTRICITY 
 
As it challenges the monopoly of the state as the source of law, so does TER call 
into question the accuracy of representing the legal system as a hierarchically 
organised, regimented and fully articulated structure.48 Concepts such as the 
‘architecture’ of law evoke an image of law as a cohesive, comprehensive system 
                                                      
43 Gralf-Peter Calliess and Moritz Renner, ‘Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global 
Governance’ (2009) 22(2) Ratio Juris, p. 267. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Fuller, n. 42 above, pp. 61–64.  
46 On the cognitive function of law, see also F. von Benda–Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann, ‘The 
Dynamics of Change and Continuity in Plural Legal Orders,’ (2006) 53(4) Journal of Legal Pluralism & 
Unofficial Law, p. 12. 
47 Cf Colin Scott, ‘Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design’ (2001) 
Public Law, p. 333. 
48 Brütsch & Lehmkuhl, n. 17 above, pp. 22–23. 
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built on solid, singular foundations — national constitutions for domestic law; the 
EU Treaties for the EU legal regime; the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
for international law.49  
The difficulties in determining which sets of laws and rules should govern 
transnational environmental regulation, illustrated in the example of the Covenant 
of Mayors, cast a shadow on the assumption of architectural cohesion of the legal 
edifice. The claims to legal status of the normative content produced through 
transnational regulatory decision making, are even harder to reconcile with a 
systematic, pyramidal vision of law. Instead, law unfolds as a network; one with 
stronger, weaker and even missing links — maybe a patchwork more than a 
network.50 The law that feeds into and emanates from transnational regulatory 
decision making does not self-organise into a monolithic structure; it is fragmented 
and polycentric. The normative practices developed and replicated within, for 
example, ISO standard setting certainly reflect aspects of domestic and regional 
administrative law regimes that are imported into the proceedings via the 
expectations and routines of governmental as well as non-governmental ISO 
members, but they cannot be properly ‘housed’ within a pre-established organigram 
of international, regional or national administrative law. Law’s structure is 
perennially inchoate.  
 
 
 
3. RESPONDING TO TRANSNATIONALISATION: RECLAIMING, 
RECONSTRUCTING OR RECONCEPTUALISING 
 
Both as subject and source of law, transnational regulation calls into question 
established assumptions about the key attributes of law. Law is perceived as 
increasingly de-localised, pluralistic, inchoate, reflexive and polycentric. The 
preceding discussion also affirms that not every variant of TER exerts an equal 
amount of pressure. The decisions of transnational environmental standard-setters 
such as the ISO, which defy easy classification under any legal regime or discipline, 
present a more acute challenge than those of the European Commission, which are 
generated through a highly developed, supranational legal regime that replicates 
many features and functions of domestic law. Yet whether nagging or acute, it would 
                                                      
49 Neil Gunningham’s work illustrates both the assumption of stability and the extent to which this 
assumption is under threat in ‘Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ 
(2009) 21(2) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 179–212. 
50 Benvenisti observes a similar sensibility reflected in recent American writing on international law: ‘a view 
shared by scholars who deny that there is anything “out there” other than solitary treaties floating around 
in no particular hierarchy in the abyss of international anarchy’. It should, however, be noted that 
representation is typically used not to challenge the systemic vision of law at a fundamental level, but to 
buttress claims for a return to the values of state sovereignty and subordination of transnational to national 
law. See E. Benvenisti, ‘The Future of International Law Scholarship in Germany: The Tension Between 
Interpretation and Change’ (2007) 67 ZaöRV, p. 587. 
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be desperately short-sighted to ignore the practical and conceptual problems that 
accompany the rise of TER.  
The following pages map out a variety of possible responses to the 
transnationalisation of law. For the sake of clarity, the material is organised into 
three distinctive categories, namely, responses that aim to reclaim law as 
conventionally conceived; those that seek to reconstruct law and thereby restore its 
conventional attributes and functionalities; and a third group of responses that 
advocate a reconceptualisation of law that is more in tune with the changes rung in 
by transnationalisation.51 It goes without saying that the full wealth of reactions to 
the transnationalisation of law, as expressed in regulation, case law and scholarship, 
does not always allow itself to be neatly stored into one of three mutually exclusive 
categories. Nor are commentators necessarily aware of whether their suggestions 
have an essentially defensive, conservative or creative bent. However, a more 
systematic understanding of the range of possible reactions to transnationalisation, 
whether expressed in case law, in scholarship or through legislative reform 
initiatives, strengthens our ability to process, contextualise and critically engage with 
individual responses.  
 
3.1. CONSERVATIVE AND DEFENSIVE: RECLAIMING LAW 
 
The transnationalisation of law unlocks a Pandora’s box of conceptual dilemmas, 
uncertainties and transitional problems. One way to solve the deluge of new 
challenges is to re-seal the box and reassert the traditional boundaries of law. To 
this end, the transnationalisation of law is resolutely kept outside the zone of ‘law 
proper’. Defensive responses to transnationalisation seek to keep intact the formal 
distinction between state-sanctioned public regulation and private regulation, 
however similar their impact. The barrier between officially promulgated, binding 
laws that are made effective through national enforcement mechanisms and backed 
up by punitive sanctions on the one hand, and conventional norms that derive their 
authority primarily from expertise, persuasion, and widespread voluntary 
compliance on the other, is strictly maintained.  
Consequently, defensive responses relegate the lion’s share of TER to the 
private legal sphere. The standards adopted by, for instance, the FSC are treated as 
private conventions; the relation between the FSC and its members is a contractual 
one. Choice of law questions that may arise in a dispute between parties in the FSC 
                                                      
51 For comparison, see Nico Krisch’s discussion of ‘containment,’ ‘transfer’ and ‘break’ as three reactions 
to the democracy challenges represented by the emergence of postnational law. See N. Krisch, Beyond 
Constitutionalism. The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2010, OUP), pp. 14–22. Krisch’s brief analysis 
focuses chiefly on the different interpretations of the relation between democracy, legitimacy and 
constitutionalism that underscore the diverse responses. The analysis below, in contrast, focuses its 
attention on the consequences of embracing one or other viewpoint. See N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism. 
The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2010, OUP), pp. 14–22. See also Berman’s discussion of 
sovereigntist, universalist and pluralist constructions of the global legal order. P. S. Berman, Global Legal 
Pluralism. A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (2014, CUP), p. 14. 
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network are resolved through conflict of law rules (also known as ‘private 
international law’) as applied by the dispute settlement body seized of the conflict. 
Third party ramifications of the contractual standards agreed to by FSC members 
are legally relevant only to the extent that such standard setting might constitute 
anti-competitive behaviour.  
More nuanced defensive responses to transnationalisation combine the desire 
to safeguard the formal divisions between law and non-law with an awareness of 
the de facto similarities between legal and non-legal norms.52 This resonates in the 
popularity of concepts such as ‘soft law,’ ‘quasi-regulation’ and ‘governance,’ which 
simultaneously underscore the similarity and the otherness of normative dynamics 
in the transnational field. OECD codes of conduct are like law yet not law; they are 
‘soft law’.53 Transnational cooperation in standard setting for sustainable farming is 
like regulation but not regulation; it is ‘quasi-regulatory’54 or constitutive of 
‘governance’ rather than a regulatory regime.55 The introduction of a sui generis set 
of para-legal terminology offers the benefit of locating the transnationalisation of 
law close enough to the legal sphere to legitimise its colonisation by lawyers, but 
simultaneously affirms the specialness and authority of the newly constructed ‘core’ 
of law and regulation. State-issued law is no longer merely law; it is ‘hard law’.  
The establishment of a para-legal zone conceptually shelters the core of ‘real’ 
law from the challenges triggered by transnationalisation, and stimulates inquiries 
into the nature and status of this newly established soft-, para- or quasi-legal 
periphery. Soft law is the subject of a rich vein of scholarship that explores the main 
reasons why actors resort to non-binding modes of norm setting; the variety of 
formats in which soft law is encapsulated; and the ways in which soft law has been 
used alongside or distinguished from hard law by traditional sources of legal 
authority.56 Many writings emphasise soft law’s precursor status: it often functions 
to lower the threshold for agreement and as a stepping stone toward a final, binding 
legal product.57 This is an affirmative account, but it does portray non-traditional 
legal activity as instrumental and in support of a more enduring, prestigious end 
goal. The final destiny for successful soft law is elevation to the ranks of real, hard 
law. 
 
                                                      
52 Ladeur, n. 4 above, p. 9. 
53 M. Marcussen ‘OECD Governance Through Soft Law’. in U. Mörth (ed.), Soft law in governance and 
regulation: an interdisciplinary analysis. (E. Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004), pp. 103–128. 
54 C. Ray, ‘Transnational Co–operation Between Rural Areas: Elements of a Political Economy of EU Rural 
Development’ (2001) Vol 43(3), Sociologia Ruralis, pp. 279–295. 
55 Cf. L. Kotzé, Global Environmental Governance. Law and Regulation for the 21st Century (2012 Edward Elgar), 
p. 83. 
56 F. Terpan, ‘Soft Law in the European Union — The Changing Nature of EU Law’ (2015) 21(1) European 
Law Journal, 68–96; J. d’Aspremont & T. Aalberts (eds) ‘Symposium on Soft Law’ (2012) 25(2) Leiden Journal 
of International Law, pp. 309–378; Heyvaert, n. 40 above, fn. 3 (overview of key publications on soft law 
between 1990 and 2009)  
57 G. Shaffer, ‘Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering’ Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2016, 
forthcoming); KW Abbott and D Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54 
International Organization 421; G Shaffer and MA Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, 
and Antagonists in International Governance’ (2010) 94 Minnesota Law Review 706. 
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3.1.1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Reclaiming Law 
Defensive responses to the transnationalisation of law have an obvious appeal. They 
avoid the disruption that accompanies attempts at reconceptualisation, preserve the 
relevance of generations of legal knowledge and praxis, and imbue decision making 
with continuity and, hence, predictability. On the other hand, unwillingness to 
confront the impacts of transnationalisation widens the gap between ‘the law on the 
books’ and ‘what really happens’ which may dent law’s credibility as an effective 
disciplining force of political power. Moreover, the decision not to engage with the 
regulatory character of transnational arrangements arguably represents a missed 
opportunity to lend structure and support to innovative attempts at public interest 
regulation. Considering the gaping chasm between the scope and pace of 
‘traditional’ climate change regulation and the extent of intervention required to 
achieve sustainable climate targets, such opportunities may be too costly to miss. 
Ultimately, the main shortcoming of boundary drawing exercises is that they 
tend to ignore or displace rather than truly resolve the tensions caused by 
transnationalisation. The conceptual clarification that comes from firmly locating, 
say, the environmental instruments adopted under the 2007 Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Charter58 outside the sphere of real law, does little to 
alleviate concerns about the transparency and responsiveness with which such 
measures were adopted. Housing the same instruments into the ‘soft law’ category 
does create some space for these issues to be debated, but offers little instruction 
on how such debates should be settled. 
Arguably, the introduction of notions such as soft law, quasi regulation and 
governance do not so much fix the boundaries between law and non-law as 
represent an institutional choice about the appropriate forum for determination. 
The question of exactly what consequences to attach to the label of ‘soft law’ usually 
remains suspended until it falls in the lap of judicial and arbitration bodies.59                
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling in Fra.bo exemplifies this.60 Here, the 
ECJ was asked whether the refusal by a German certification body, the Deutsche 
Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW), to recognise the validity of 
a certificate issued by an Italian certification entity which was not on DVGW’s 
approved list, could be construed as an impediment to the free movement of goods 
(Article 34 TFEU, then 28 EC). The catch was that DVGW is a private organisation. 
Under German law, DVGW certification is not essential to prove that construction 
products (in this case, copper fittings) meet mandatory safety standards, but the 
DVGW certificate bestows a presumption of conformity. Alternative avenues to 
                                                      
58 Koh Kheng–Lian, ‘Transboundary and Global Environmental Issues: The Role of ASEAN’ (2012) 1(1) 
Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 67–82. 
59 See E. Korkea Aho, ‘Laws in Progress? Reconceptualizing Accountability Strategies in the Era of 
Framework Norms’ (2013) 2(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 363–385, at 378–384. 
60 Case C–171/11, Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas– und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) — Technisch–
Wissenschaftlicher Verein, judgment of 12 July 2012. 
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prove compliance are underspecified and costly.61 In its submission, the DVGW 
asserted that only the German state was bound by Article 28 EC. Consequently, 
there was ‘nothing preventing the DVGW from drawing up technical standards 
which go beyond those in place in Member States other than the Federal Republic 
of Germany and to apply them to its certification activities. It is also free, on quality-
related grounds, to take account only of laboratories accredited by it’.62 The ECJ did 
not dispute DVGW’s status as a private body, but considered that because, first, 
German legislation provided that goods certified by DVGW would be compliant 
with national law; secondly, the DVGW was the only body that certified copper 
fittings in Germany; and, thirdly, a lack of certification by DVGW would result in 
serious difficulties in placing the product on the market, the DVGW ‘in reality (held) 
the power to regulate’.63 
Fra.bo relies on a preponderance of the evidence approach to resolve the 
boundary dispute and situate DVGW’s certification activities on the public side of 
the public/private divide. The case-by-case, solving approach to questions regarding 
the legal status of non-traditional regulators, which is inherent in judicial 
determination, imbues the process with a considerable degree of flexibility and 
scope for fairness in decision making. At the same time however, it is not the most 
conducive to establishing general criteria regarding the legal status of de facto 
authoritative bodies. It takes more than one ruling to confidently crystallise 
generalisable rules. In this manner, too, the institutional choice to settle ‘boundary 
disputes’ through (individual) judicial determination instead of through (general) 
rule making presents itself as a defensive rather than offensive response to the 
transnationalisation of law.  
 
3.2. CONSERVATIVE AND ADAPTIVE: RECONSTRUCTING LAW 
 
A second cohort of responses to the transnationalisation of law shares with the first 
that it is essentially conservative: it seeks to alleviate the pressures on conventional 
understandings of the location, sources, functions, disciplines and structure of law. 
But in contrast to the first, commentators who espouse conservative and adaptive 
perspectives display a greater willingness to confront the undesirable consequences 
of maintaining a strict law/non-law, public/private divide. Such undesirable 
consequences may manifest in, for example, the inability of contract law to address 
the lack of transparency with which private transnational regulators behave. Or in 
the inability to appeal against decisions adopted by transnational environmental 
regulators, such as the CDM Executive Board.64 Following a conservative and 
adaptive approach, law should be tweaked, adapted and, where necessary, newly 
produced to bridge the discrepancy between the private form and the public 
                                                      
61 Ibid., at [29]. 
62 Ibid., at [14]. 
63 Ibid., at [31]. 
64 C. Streck & J. Lin, ‘Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the Need for Reform’ 
(2008) 19(2) European Journal of International Law, pp. 409–442, at 426–428. 
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substance of transnational regulation. New law should fix the gaps in the fabric of 
legal protection torn by the emergence of transnational regulators. Conservative and 
adaptive responses to the transnationalisation of law aim to reconstruct the 
conventional role and functions of law through the creation of new generations of 
public transnational law. 
Views differ on whether adapting law to the transnational context is a matter 
of implementing a few discrete fixes, or instead calls for a large-scale overhaul. It 
has been argued that, in their enthusiasm for the new and challenging, scholars easily 
overestimate the proportion and weight of transnational regulation. In reality, it is 
countered, the irritation caused by the transnationalisation of law remains modest, 
and most of it can be managed with old fashioned legal tools.65 Conflict of laws 
doctrines may not provide perfect answers to problems of dislocation, but they still 
perform the core task of identifying possible forums and plausible legal regimes 
under which transnational legal conflicts can be housed. Similarly, in response to 
the challenges associated with the blurring public/private divide, it is possible to 
expand the scope of state regulation of the private sector to introduce requirements 
that specifically address the increasingly regulatory character of private governance. 
Such requirements may be adopted under the mantle of shareholder protection, 
consumer protection, or environmental protection. Their main target is to imprint 
an ethos of good governance on the private sector that is comparable to the 
expectations of administrative law vis-à-vis public regulators. The official justification 
of transparency, consultation and review requirements may be the protection of 
shareholder or consumer interests, but their introduction simultaneously supports 
the development of a broader concept of responsibility and accountability of 
(private) transnational regulators.  
Thus, the tensions that result from maintaining a formal distinction between 
public and private regulators are alleviated through the introduction of functional 
equivalents of public law expectations in the private sphere.66 As an example, Kahler 
refers to the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), which requires private companies to 
establish a contract management system. Such systems can reduce the risk of 
contract failure, but whether it was cost effective to implement them was formerly 
down to the individual enterprise to decide. The introduction of the contract 
management requirement as a legal obligation could be viewed as a response to the 
growing expectation that private as well as public organisations conform to ‘best 
practice’ or ‘good governance’ as a matter of law, in the interest of both their 
contractual partners and the public at large.67 
                                                      
65 Ralf Michaels, for example, has proposed a more inclusive approach to conflicts of law as a way to resolve 
competing claims between state and non–state law. See R. Michaels, ‘The Re–Statement of Non–State Law: 
The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism’ (2005) 51 The Wayne Law Review, 
pp. 1209–1258, at 1250–1258. Zumbansen, n. 5 above, p. 127. Note that Zumbansen discusses this view 
in the literature, but does not personally espouse it. 
66 See H. J. Steiner & D. F. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems (2d ed. 1976, Foundation Press), p. xvii. 
67 L. Kahler, ‘Contract–Management Duties as a New Regulatory Device’ (2013) 76 Law & Contemporary 
Problems, pp. 89–103, at 90 & 94. 
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Others consider that the disruptive consequences of the transnationalisation of law 
cannot be countered by mere tweaking, but require more thorough and systematic 
legal reform efforts.68 Natasha Affolder’s aforementioned study of transnational 
conservation contracts leads her to examine the notions of fairness in private 
(contractual) law and in public (international environmental) law. Her conclusion is 
that the two notions are not fully reconcilable; in fact, they pull in opposite 
directions. Fairness in contract law refers to the fairness between the contracting 
parties, and is typically protected by ensuring the privity of the contractual relations 
and prioritising contractual interests over external concerns. Fairness in 
international environmental law, in contrast, is closely bound with notions of 
transparency and access to the negotiation process. In these circumstances, it is 
difficult to simply tweak notions of fairness in contract law to reflect the regulatory 
aspects of transnational conservation contracts without such adaptation effectively 
constituting a distortion. Correspondingly, Affolder calls for a more advanced 
response in the development of a transnational legal concept of fairness that 
‘extends rather than simply recycles fairness thinking in domestic and international 
law’.69 In a similar vein, Benjamin Richardson uncovers fundamental tensions 
between Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) as a transnational governance 
regime and fiduciary finance law: ‘The seemingly exclusive focus of fiduciary law on 
the interests of investors, especially their financial interests, potentially clashes with 
any vision of SRI prioritizing environmental and social responsibility’.70 The 
reconciliation, he argues, involves adopting both a more productive rationale for 
SRI and a reconceptualisation of fiduciary law.71 
In their most expansive expression, conservative and adaptive responses to the 
transnationalisation of law advocate the establishment of new, encompassing legal 
frameworks to govern TER. EU administrative law, an initially underdeveloped 
tenet of EU legal integration that has gradually matured in response to the growing 
presence and immediacy of EU regulation,72 is often advanced as a model for the 
development of additional regional, or potentially global, regimes of public law.73 
Alternative conceptions for models of public transnational law include the 
development of ‘an international law of corporate social responsibility’. The idea 
starts from the premise that contemporary international law, although formally 
established through and for states, usually has major economic actors as its real 
addressees. Their differentiated status is increasingly recognised in international law, 
for example, in the context of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. An 
international law of corporate social responsibility could constitute the 
                                                      
68 Bethlehem, n. 6 above, p. 19. 
69 Affolder, n. 32 above, pp. 456–460. 
70 Richardson, n. 32 above, p. 327. 
71 Ibid., pp. 332–337. 
72 H. P. Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law (1999, Hart Publishing), pp. 214. 
73 Kuo, n. 35 above, pp. 857–858; 862; Ellen Vos, ‘Making Informal International Law Accountable: 
Lessons from the EU’ in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters (eds), Informal International 
Lawmaking (2012, OUP), pp. 369–381. 
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‘differentiated responsibility pillar’ to match the differentiated position and access 
that major economic actors increasingly enjoy in the international legal sphere.  
Along similar lines, Bethlehem suggests a ‘lex congregatio’ or ‘law of society’. In 
a preliminary attempt to operationalise this model, he proposes the following 
features: 
 
first, an instrument of traditional inter-state law that would act as a platform 
on which would stand a second tier set of protocols and principles addressing 
the application and mutual recognition of rules and standards relevant to 
particular conduct; thirdly, a further tier of industry-driven and derived 
minimum standards of conduct; and all this finally held together by a basic 
principle that actors are bound by what they accept — whether by their 
conduct, by the click of a mouse button on an “I agree” icon on a software 
program, or in some other manner.74 
 
3.2.1. Reconstructing Law: Strengths and Weaknesses  
The strongest appeal of defensive and adaptive responses is that they acknowledge 
the disruptive impacts of transnationalisation head-on, and seek to mend the fissures 
between the idea of law and law in practice through enduring, sustainable solutions. 
These solutions, which usually consist of the introduction of new layers of public 
law to govern transnational action and clarify the status of transnational regulatory 
decisions, enable law to regain a sense of locality, exclusivity in authorship, 
disciplinary clarity, constitutional and regulatory functionality, and 
comprehensiveness. They recast the net in order better to cover the richness and 
variety of transnational regulatory activity, which helps to restore the concept of law 
in its traditional splendour.  
Less felicitously, the reconstruction of law engenders an extensive degree of 
juridification in an already heavily legalised world. Moreover, it begs the question by 
whose authority any new layers of law to govern transnational activity could 
legitimately be adopted. The dilemma is neatly illustrated in a discussion by Thoko 
Kaime and Robert Glicksman on the vulnerability of eco-system markets to 
underperformance, abuse and fraud. The authors trace the problem partly to a 
dearth of accountability requirements in ecosystem contracting, and propose the 
following solution:  
 
We believe that the foundation of a reliable market that is capable of achieving 
efficient and effective protection of ecosystem services must rest on five pillars 
of accountability: (i) financial safeguards, (ii) verifiable performance standards, 
(iii) transparency and public participation standards, (iv) regulatory oversight 
mechanisms, and (v) rule of law safeguards. We derive these standards from 
three sources. Firstly, these accountability tools emerge from identification of 
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Veerle Heyvaert                  Rethinking Law through Transnational Environmental Regulation 
 
 23 
the flaws we believe are responsible for the abuses of market-based approaches 
to environmental protection discussed above. Secondly, we draw on experience 
from market-based programmes which appear to have worked well or which 
include mechanisms that promise to effectively curb abuses of environmental 
markets, such as the US CAA acid rain programme and the CWA wetlands 
protection programme. Thirdly, we rely on important principles of 
international law, such as the obligations to provide transparency and 
opportunities for public participation imposed by the Aarhus Convention.75 
 
Kaime and Glicksman’s care in justifying the basis for their selection of five 
accountability standards underscores the essentially precarious nature of the 
exercise. In the absence of a transnational legislature, the borders between 
proposing and imposing legal order are ill-defined. When all is said and done, Kaime 
and Glicksman’s list of accountability standards remains the fruit of their selection 
process; it has credibility because the authors are legal professionals and experts, but 
this is not the kind of credibility that is typically considered sufficient to justify acts 
of law making.  
Proposals for the reconstruction of law at the transnational level must confront 
the uneasy reality that they are, in essence, undemocratically formulated responses 
to problems that are, themselves, in no small measure a consequence of the 
dissolution between regulation and democratic oversight in the transnational 
sphere.76 The EU legal regime, we recall, faces unrelenting ‘democratic deficit’ 
allegations, in spite of having incorporated over the years a veritable arsenal of 
checks and balances, institutional innovations and decision making mechanisms in 
a continuing quest to boost the democratic credibility of its legislative and regulatory 
output. The EU experience serves as a cautionary reminder that the mission of 
reconstructing law at the transnational level to govern transnational regulatory 
activity will inevitably be fraught with political controversy and ongoing challenges 
to the authority of the transnational legal regime. 
 
3.3. CREATIVE AND ADAPTIVE: RECONCEPTUALISING LAW 
 
Whether a fringe event or a development that affects vast swathes of the legal 
system, the transnationalisation of law presents a problem that needs to be managed. 
That is the view shared by those who seek to reclaim or reconstruct law. The implicit 
assumption from which both lines of thought depart, is that the traditional 
understanding of law as territorial, emanating from the state, organised in public and 
private domains, functionally constitutive, regulating and structurally 
comprehensive, is a notion worth protecting and preserving. However, what if we 
relinquish the idea that law is and must always remain defined by these traditional 
                                                      
75 Glicksman & Kaime, n. 21 above, p. 271. 
76 Cf A. Somek, ‘Constituent Power in National and Transnational Contexts’ (2012) 3(1) Transnational Legal 
Theory, pp. 31–60. 
                                                                                               04/2016 
 
 24 
attributes, and instead embrace the possibility of the metamorphosis of law into a 
ubiquitous, pluralistic, fragmented and reflexive phenomenon? Or, what if we start 
from an alternative assumption, namely, that the traditional attributes of law have 
always been mythical? Arguably, law has never really lived up to its territorial, state-
based and comprehensive billing.77 If that is the case, then the rise of transnational 
regulation has not transformed the nature of law but instead tipped the veil on the 
artificiality of the incumbent paradigm.78  
The latter perspectives are likely to elicit adaptive and creative responses that 
seek not to restore but instead to reconceptualise law. 79 The transnationalisation of 
law is not so much a disruption to be managed as it is an opportunity to further our 
knowledge about law’s nature and dynamics; to adapt the cognitive frameworks 
through which legal processes are perceived and constructed, and to develop a 
paradigm that is better attuned to the new (or newly revealed) reality of law. In this 
context, transnational law is no longer a shorthand for law that does not fit the 
within mainstream paradigm, but becomes the denominator of an alternative 
account of law that ‘methodologically responds to the fragmented, embedded 
evolutionary dynamics of norm creation in the context of world society’.80 
The reconceptualisation of law necessitates the development of new tools to 
organise and structure our thinking about law; tools that are not reliant on 
conventional tropes (e.g., sovereignty, jurisdiction), dividing lines (e.g., the 
public/private divide) and decisionistic mechanisms (primacy). The creative effort 
of rethinking law in a mode that is less beholden to its conventional attributes 
echoes the intellectual challenges experienced in the quest for a de-institutionalised, 
de-centred concept of regulation. As in that case, it is difficult to break free from 
the shackles of conventional thinking; we all too easily equip new models with thinly 
disguised re-workings of old formulae. In a second parallel with the 
reconceptualisation of regulation, the development of a paradigm of transnational 
law is very much work in progress. The paragraphs below introduce some of the 
key exponents of the process so far. 
 
3.3.1 The Organisation of Transnational Law 
A first prominent feature in transnationalisation scholarship is the demarcation of 
nascent legal spheres that are neither territorially defined nor clearly reducible to the 
public or private sphere. Attempts to chart domains of law that are united by 
characteristics other than their shared geography or location in the public or private 
field, respond to our abiding need for boundaries to structure legal thought and 
action. The existence of disciplinary boundaries facilitates the performance of a 
number of essential operations including, to name but a few, the framing and 
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scoping of legal conflicts; the selection of relevant bodies of legislation, case law and 
literature for the purpose of research and argumentation; and the identification of 
fields of professional expertise. The waning relevance of territorial boundaries and 
public/private divides is therefore as disorienting as it is liberating, and fuels a 
demand for new categorisations and criteria to organise the vast expanse of law into 
manageable segments. 
The quest for functional equivalents to territorial and traditional disciplinary 
divides may well explain why the lex mercatoria, for instance, is experiencing 
something of a revival in today’s legal scholarship. In contemporary writing, it is 
frequently held up as a model for transnational law that has an autonomous identity 
and an internal logic without being territorially confined or anchored to a pre-
determined source of legal authority.81 It serves as both a structural and, evidently, 
linguistic inspiration for the denomination of new transnational fields such as the 
lex digitalis, which refers to the burgeoning body of principles, conventions and rules 
that structure the online environment, and the lex sportiva, which fulfil a parallel 
function for sports.82 
The identification of delocalised fields of law may be accompanied by 
proposals to align emerging legal frameworks along traditional formats, which 
imbue the discussion with a reconstructive lean. Yet others eschew the traditional 
trappings of legality and are geared towards the analytical exercise of uncovering 
transnational law as they find it. Compare, for example, Bethlehem’s 
aforementioned proposal for a lex congregatio with von Benda-Beckmann’s discussion 
of ‘project law’. The former derives its legal status from ‘an instrument of traditional 
inter-state law that would act as a platform’.83 ‘Project law,’ in contrast, refers to an 
organically evolving body of principles, rules and procedures made and replicated 
by transnationally operating funding agencies and development projects. It is a 
flexible category that may expand to include stipulations determined by law and 
political conditions of the donor country, but its identity as project law and its 
internal organisation are not dependent on the involvement of state law.84 
The turn towards delocalised fields of law that are neither public nor private, 
has important institutional ramifications. The dissolution of clear public/private 
distinctions between actors connected to a transnational project or linked via 
commercial practices, digital networks or sporting events, creates scope for access 
on equal terms to institutional resources such as review processes and dispute 
settlement mechanisms. The multiplication of legal authorship may thus constitute 
the basis for an expansion of external accountability. Thus far, the cracks in the 
                                                      
81 E.g., Gunther Teubner, ‘The Project of Constitutional Sociology: Irritating Nation State 
Constitutionalism’ (2013) 4(1) Transnational Legal Theory pp. 44–58 at 49; Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping 
Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria (2nd ed., 2010, Center for Transnational Law); Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The 
New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance’ (2006) 13(5) Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 627–
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institutional wall between the public and private spheres have mostly favoured large 
transnational firms, granting them privileged standing in claims vis-à-vis state bodies, 
most controversially so in litigation on the basis of investment treaty provisions.85 
However, a fuller reconceptualisation of law in the transnational context might open 
the door towards a finer calibration of actor’s rights and responsibilities that is no 
longer determined by their public or private status, and that instead takes its cue 
from their relative position in the commercial/digital/project/sporting network.  
 
3.3.2. The Plurality of Transnational Law 
A pressing agenda point for advocates of reconceptualisation, is to devise 
productive solutions to the loss of hierarchy as an ordering mechanism and a 
problem solving technique. The sources of transnational law are understood as 
plural, heterarchical, and theoretically infinite: there is no pre-ordained limit on the 
range of actors that engage in transnational norm-generating behaviour.86 Moreover, 
no single institution — whether state, intergovernmental organisation or association 
of large commercial enterprises — can credibly lay claim to the exclusive 
competence to recognise and validate the creation of transnational law. 
Transnational law can thrive in the absence of a discernible Grundnorm and beyond 
the control of a designated authority equipped to sanction and rank its normative 
communications. The rise of transnational law thus creates a double bind: it 
generates new layers of normativity, which increases the likelihood that situations 
will be governed by multiple, potentially conflicting bodies of law. Yet it 
simultaneously strips law of its most effective decision making technique, namely, 
resolving conflict through determinations of primacy, made by institutions that have 
been constitutionally empowered to that effect. 
The most obvious way of dealing with the plurality of law is, simply, to bear it. 
That is, to resist he urge to stratify spheres of legality and to tolerate accompanying 
incommensurabilities in legal decision making as the inevitable side-effect of high 
levels of diversified legal productivity. One of the most developed exponents of this 
approach can be found in Nico Krisch’s postnational, radical pluralism. Radical 
pluralism embodies an appealingly optimistic disposition: it expresses faith in the 
resilience of legal structures; they can bear a quantity of dissonance without 
descending into chaos.87 Moreover, Krisch argues that it is important not to 
overstate the degree of conflict that legal pluralism will elicit: for all its diversity, 
there are strong similarities and overlaps in our normative heritage that influence 
legal decision making within and outside conventional legal regimes. Finally, an 
absence of hierarchy does not necessarily equate an unwillingness to take inspiration 
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from others. Plurality leaves scope for informal coordination, which could 
potentially reap more stable results than hierarchically imposed assimilation. 
 
3.3.3. The Functions and Structure of Transnational Law  
Creative and adaptive responses to transnationalisation are less preoccupied with 
restoring law’s waning constitutive and disciplining force vis-à-vis transnational 
environmental regulation, and more with harnessing the reflexive and 
communicative strengths of law. In this vein, one of transnational law’s chief 
functions is to enable the ‘peaceful co-existence’ of heterarchical normative regimes. 
Importantly, transnational law does so not by exogenously imposing a 
superstructure of constitutional and administrative prescriptions to which 
transnational regimes must be subjected, but through the introduction of interstitial 
norms88 that serve to coordinate, orchestrate and moderate.89 The emphasis on the 
liaising, facilitating functions of law has a profound structural impact. Under a 
creative, adaptive conceptualisation of transnational law, the norms that govern 
transnational regulatory behaviour are not created outside the regulatory context but 
are better understood as composite co-products of the very practice of transnational 
regulation.90 They are not situated above but in-between an indeterminate and 
changing number of regulatory regimes, their content and status constantly evolving 
through processes of regulatory application and feedback.  
 
3.3.4. Reconceptualising Law: Strengths and Weaknesses 
Creative and adaptive responses to transnationalisation exercise a powerful draw on 
the legal imagination. Although less familiar, the idea of organically co-produced 
norms that emerge from the very behaviour that they seek to govern, arguably rings 
truer to experience than the sterile representation of law and action as essentially 
separate spheres.91 In this vein, Zumbansen comments on the concreteness, the 
earthiness of legal pluralism: ‘Legal pluralists, by drawing on anthropological and 
sociological accounts to more adequately capture the dynamics of norm-creation 
and regulatory practice, scrutinize the distinction between a legal and a social norm 
to better understand the concrete process through which a norm comes into 
existence and is adhered to or rejected’.92 
The lure of reconceptualising law seems to grow even stronger when contrasted 
with the repressive inclination of attempts to reclaim law. The former’s willingness 
to acknowledge ‘norms that do not fit’ throws into sharp relief the tendency of 
defensive and conservative responses to ignore or define them out of existence. 
                                                      
88 Cf. V. Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolutive 
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Such responses may bring short-term relief, but they are hardly sustainable attempts 
at problem solving.  
The reconceptualisation of law along more heterarchical, pluralistic and 
reflective lines could also be preferable to conservative and adaptive (reconstructive) 
approaches. Pragmatically speaking, reconceptualisation may be more attainable 
than the large-scale legislative efforts that would be required to replicate the 
conventional structure, organisation and functions of law at the transnational level. 
If developments in international environmental law over the past 20 years are an 
indication, there is currently a limited appetite for the kind of grand legislative 
orchestration that would be needed to develop a coherent, overarching transnational 
legal framework. The universalistic spirit of the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)93 and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD),94 it transpires, did not set the mould for the future of 
environmental agreements, but instead contrasts with the more recent practice of 
international environmental lawmaking which, when it is not amending Protocols 
and Annexes to older treaties, tends to be either regional and/or narrowly sectoral 
in nature.95 The only arguable exception to the narrowing remit of international 
agreements is the Aarhus Convention on Access to Environmental Information, 
Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice, which is now nearly 
20 years old and is, in fact, regional rather than global in scope. 
Reconceptualisation and reconstruction also represent starkly different political 
choices, neither of them unproblematic. To many, the advanced juridification that 
accompanies reconstructive approaches, and the extent to which they concentrate 
decision making power in the hands of a global, politically unaccountable elite, are 
deeply unsettling.96 The pluralism of creative and adaptive responses to 
transnationalisation could offer an antidote to the development of a winner-decides-
all society.97 The absence of a supreme body of law, interpreted by a privileged set 
of transnational institutions, is a welcome reminder of the virtues of opposition and 
contestability. Moreover, as Krisch observes with regard to contestation, in 
instances where legal regimes collide, there is no reason to assume that law is better 
equipped than politics to resolve the ensuing tensions.98  
However, the pluralistic model, too, poses significant political risks. Pluralism 
may result in a greater diffusion of power than attempts to reconstruct law at the 
transnational level, but it is equally vulnerably to the democratic deficit critique.99 
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The lex mercatoria, for example, is hardly the law of the people; it is made by and 
arguably in support of a global commercial elite with expert transactional 
knowledge, yet its reach extends far beyond its authors.100  
Secondly, an open acknowledgement of legal pluralism may erode law’s 
legitimizing function. Since the connection between TER and democratic 
representation is both weak and remote, the legitimacy of transnational regulators 
is strongly beholden to alternative claims to authority. These are typically partially 
based on qualities such as expertise and output efficiency, but they are also 
significantly furthered by the perception that the transnational actor under scrutiny 
is accountable and respects the rule of law. Legal pluralism might both limit the 
availability and robustness of accountability mechanisms, and erode the universal 
significance of the concept of the rule of law, thus diluting the alternative bases 
upon which transnational actors can justify the power they wield. Unless backed up 
by additional guarantees, diffusion is a very thin basis on which to legitimate the 
exercise of otherwise unchecked legislative power. 
Thirdly, Krisch’s analysis, although impressively expansive, does not take into 
account what might be labelled as the ‘more advanced’ forms of transnational law, 
namely, the norms generated by private, hybrid or networked regulators outside the 
auspices of an international legal regime established with the fiat of participating 
states. Marty-Delmas’ work on Ordering Pluralism, too, stays within the confines of 
highly institutionalised legal orders such as the UN treaty regime, the WTO, the 
ECHR and the EU.101 Whether the legal system possesses sufficient resilience to 
also productively respond to the normativity generated through private, hybrid and 
informal regulatory networks, remains untested.  
A final weakness is that, although creative responses may be grounded in a 
more contextualised and resonant understanding of processes of norm-creation 
than conservative ones, their very analytical richness can simultaneously stunt their 
normative potential. Like spontaneity, plurality is difficult to engineer. It is in the 
formulation of reform proposals that advocates of pluralism are most prone to fall 
back on conventional tropes. The above-mentioned ‘interstitial norms,’102 which 
should serve to coordinate between heterarchical normative spheres, exemplify the 
slippery slope between coordination and juridifcation and, thus, between 
reconceptualisation and reconstruction. In Delmas-Marty’s work, for example, the 
assertion is made that legal pluralism should in the first place be organised through 
practices of cross-referencing.103 It is an elegant solution to the decisionistic void at 
the heart of legal pluralism, and there is widespread evidence of this practice in 
transnational regulatory and judicial decision making.104 However, the suggestion 
does inevitably beg the question whether the requirement to cross-reference then 
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becomes, itself, the hierarchically superior norm with which the plurality of legal 
regimes must conform and, thus, carries within itself the seeds to undermine the 
pluralistic vision.105  
 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It makes intuitive sense that the emergence of new spheres of transnational and 
often informal authority would challenge conventional understandings of law. The 
contribution of this paper was to pinpoint with greater precision where the impacts 
are being felt. To this end, the analysis identified five key pressure points, namely, 
conceptualisations of the location, source, organisation, functions and structure of 
law. For each of these attributes, the expansion of transnational governance regimes, 
such as those aimed at transnational environmental regulation, provokes a 
problematisation of long held assumptions about what law is and how it works.  
Beyond mapping out the breadth of transformations that, together, constitute 
the transnationalisation of law, the discussion conveyed a number of significant 
messages regarding the relation between TER and law. Not every variant of 
transnational regulation is equally challenging to mainstream conceptualisations of 
law. Unsurprisingly, regulatory initiatives that flourish under the auspices of well-
established frameworks of international or regional law, with EU regulation as a 
prime example, pose less acute conceptual challenges than transnational private and 
hybrid regulatory networks, which may display an evolving composition and exert 
fluctuating levels of authority. However, the discussion equally confirmed that, if 
the presence of a mature regime such as EU environmental regulation is superficially 
reconcilable with the traditional conceptualisation of law, dissonances remain. The 
EU legal regime may offer rough functional equivalents to the assumptions of 
territoriality, exclusivity, exhaustiveness and cohesion that support traditional 
understandings of legality, but closer inspection quickly reveals their frailty. Even 
the densely institutionalised, highly organised landscape of EU law cannot fully 
camouflage the gaps and fissures caused by the evolution of transnational regulatory 
authority. 
A key message that resonates from the overview of possible reactions to the 
transnationalisation of law, is that seemingly ‘commonsensical’ proposals for the 
classification of new forms of environmental regulation, or for the extension or 
introduction of new rules and principles to govern them, represent important 
choices that are not only conceptual but also deeply political in nature. The term 
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‘soft law’ has become so ubiquitous that its use is hardly questioned. Yet it is 
important to remember that its deployment implies a clear choice to maintain a 
hierarchy between traditional and alternative sources of authority. In a similar vein, 
the frequently voiced opinion that TER is likely to suffer from deficiencies in 
transparency and accountability which should be overcome through the imposition 
of good governance standards borrowed from the wellsprings of national 
administrative law, is not ‘simply’ a sound suggestion to respond to perceived 
legitimacy deficits, but also represents a decision to centralise legislative authority; a 
decision with serious democratic and distributive consequences. Conversely, the 
approach to reconceptualise law as pluralistic, polycentric and reflexive may result 
in an alternative distribution of authority, but it is equally political and contentious. 
The aim of the exploration in this paper was not to elevate one of the three identified 
responses as superior, but to drive home the point that none of these choices are 
innocent.  
 
